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ABSTRACT 
In January, 1998 the Archusa Creek Dam failed by breaching through its 
emergency spillway. The dam is a low earth dam, 7.6 m (25 ft) tall, and 1370 m 
(4,500 ft) crest length. It is located in southeast Mississippi, in Clarke County, near 
the town of Quitman. At the time of its failure, the dam had a concrete ogee weir for 
a principal spillway, and a vegetated earth emergency spillway. (Spillway 
configuration has been modified since the failure.) The impounded lake is a state-
owned water park, used solely for recreation. Fortunately, the dam is a low hazard 
structure. The Chickasawhay River is less than 0.4 km (V. mi) downstream of the 
dam. The dam is in the flood plain of the river; accordingly, there is little 
development downstream. Consequences of failure were mostly limited to the loss of 
the water park. 
The dam failed during a rain storm corresponding to approximately a 5 year 
return period. The failure was triggered by intense rainfall of near 10.8 cm (4.25 in.) 
falling in just a few hours over the watershed. The watershed is very large compared 
to the size of the reservoir; the ratio of watershed area to lake surface area exceeds 
50: I. Consequently, such a storm event results in very high inflow to the reservoir. 
Runoff generated by the storm caused a rapid rise in lake level to elevation above the 
flood pool, resulting in flow over both the principal and the emergency spillways. A 
breach formed through the emergency spillway due to erosion. The failure 
mechanism is an established, well known one, of progressive erosion and head-
cutting due to excessive water flow velocity. 
By modern design standards, the dam should have sustained this storm event 
without incident. Modifications to the dam made in 1994 set the stage for failure . 
The paper evaluates these modifications, along with the dam's design and specific 
features and factors that led to failure. 
INTRODUCTION 
Archusa Creek Dam was built in 1971 . Figure I illustrates the location of the 
dam, near Quitman, Mississippi. A state agency owns the lake and dam; it is used 
exclusively for recreation (operation of a water park). The lake is shallow, with 
typical depth of about 1.2 m (4 ft), and generally ranging from 1.2 to 2.4 m (4 to 8 ft). 
The lake is about 172 ha (425 ac). Size of the lake's watershed is about 
15,800 ha (39,000 ac) , resulting in significant in-flow to the lake during storm events. 
There is little storage volume available in the lake compared to in-flow; 
consequently, the dam must pass nearly all in-flow. 
The lake is in the flood-plain of Chickasawhay River. A high river stage 
produces tail-water below the dam that often exceeds the lake elevation. 
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DAM DETAILS 
The dam is built of compacted earth fill with a maximum height of 7.6 m (25 
ft) and a length of about 1370 m (4,500 ft). The dam is homogenous, with no internal 
seepage control and no foundation cut-off. Fill material for the dam is generally fine 
silty sand, as this soil was locally available for construction. 
In the 19805 the principal spillway was fitted with an inflatable gate; this 
configuration was modified in 1994 due to ongoing problems with maintenance and 
vandalism. In 1994 the spillway was modified with an ogee crest and series of sluice 
gates through the ogee. The crest and the gate inlets were all fitted with fish retaining 
Figure 1. Location map (source map USGS Quitman, Miss. Quadrangle, 1983). 
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DETAILS OF DAM BREACH FAILURE 
The breach fonned by erosion of soil within the vegetated earth emergency 
spillway due to high discharge velocity which the spillway surface could not sustain. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the position of the breach within the dam. The stonn 
causing the failure was an event corresponding to a 5 year return period. Rainfall 
from this stonn was nearly 16.5 cm (6.5 in.) in a 3 day period. However, the dam's 
failure was preceded by intense rainfall of 10.8 cm (4.25 in.) over a period of only a 
few hours. 
Figure 2. Breach through emergency spillway. 
Archusa Creek Dam. 
Figure 3. Close-up view of breach. 
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Figure 4. Breach through emergency spillway showing grass surface. 
Figure 5. Photo illustrating principal spillway and typical depth of lake. 
Emergency Spillway Operation 
Analysis shows that the emergency spillway would activate with a storm 
corresponding to a 2 year return period. Consequently, the emergency spillway was 
subjected to frequent flow. Hydraulic analysis indicates that flow in the emergency 
spillway in the 1998 failure storm was 200 m3/s (7,000 cu fil s) , with a velocity 
exceeding 1.5 mls (5 ftls) . 
Erosion Mechanism 
NRCS and USACE design references establish a range of velocity that a 
vegetated earth spillway can sustain. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) (2003) tabulates sustainable velocity listed in applicable NRCS and USACE 
design guide documents, as excerpted below, in Figure 6. The NRCS document 
establishes a typical sustainable velocity in the range of 0.6 to 1.5 mls (2 to 5 ftls), 
depending on the base soil and the grass type. Maximum sustainable velocity 
(atypical) is about 2.4 mls (8 fil s) for a non-erodible soil and specific Bermuda 
species of grass. 
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Figure 6. Range of sustainable Velocity on Vegetated Earth Surface (from FERC 
(2003». 
The fine silty sand soil used as fill in the emergency spillway has a low 
resistance to erosion. According to the criteria in Figure 6, maximum sustainable 
velocity on the Archusa Creek Dam's emergency spillway is 0.8 mls (2.5 ftls) . Based 
on calculated velocity during the 1998 failure storm near 1.5 mls (5 ftls) , erosion 
through the spillway material would have been expected. The calculated velocity is 
based on the broad flat spillway; the ditch excavated into the emergency spillway 
would have resulted in velocity exceeding 1.5 mls (5 ftls). 
The specific erosion mechanism is illustrated and explained by Seed et al 
(2006) . This group extensively studied the soil erosion process in levee over-topping 
after the Hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans. The work by Seed et al is not 
specifically applicable to vegetated earth spillways. But the erosion principle for 
soils is the same in the levee study and in the case of the dam spillway. Results of the 
New Orleans levee study match with the specific events on the dam spillway, the 
erosion of a fine sand soil. The levee study parameters for velocity and critical shear 
stress apply to a bare soil without vegetation. For the dam spillway, once the 
vegetation was lost during the breach event, the resulting bare soil was then simi lar to 
the study condition. 
Figure 7 illustrates that fine silty sand soil within the dam's emergency 
spillway is generally the most easily eroded soil category, and that erosion will result 
in this soil at a shear stress of about 0.1 N/m2, the minimum for all soil types. 
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Figure 7. Quantified measure of erodibility- Critical shear stress versus mean 
soil grain size (From Seed et al (2006» . 
Figure 8 shows that for shear stress above the threshold value for fine sand, 
0.1 N /m2, a significant scour rate results. For the water velocity imparted to the 
spillway during the fa ilure storm, exceeding 1.0 mis, Figure 8 indicates that fine sand 
in the spillway would erode at a rate exceeding 1000 mmIhr. These values apply to a 
bare soil not protected by vegetation. Accordingly, the values do not establish 
specific parameters for velocity and erosion rate applicable to the dam spillway. 
However, Figure 8 does provide a quantifiable indication that erosion would take 
place within the dam spillway during the breach storm event. 
l':ltOOOO,----,------,,-----, 10..'«00 I. 1 
,. , 
lOOCOO r- - - - - - - - - - - -
' I 1 
1000: .00 
_ __ ~ ___ L __ _ 
1 • 
lOC.OO ~ - - - +- - - - -+- - - -
1 I 
lCoo r- - ;- - I - - - J - - -
lCo r---L--_.L_--
, , 
• 1- -g-_'nd CO r--- - -
• I D;~ =O.J Ull:n 
i 
< 0: +---->---->-----1 '" +----->---->------1 
)0 101) l )J.O O.l 1.0 u.;;. 1000 
Figure 8. Erodibility function for a sand (from Seed, et. al. (2006». 
With the expected scour rate over 1000 mmlhr, and velocity imparted to the 
spillway exceeding I mis, Figure 9 illustrates that the spillway would be highly 
erodible and prone to failure by overtopping. The levee study results depicted in 
Figures 7 through 9, combined with the sustainable velocity range portrayed in Figure 
6, explain why erosion resulted in the spillway during the breach stonn event. 
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Figure 9. Proposed guidelines for levee overtopping (from Seed et. aI. (2006» . 
Overtopping is essentially the same erosion process that takes place in a 
vegetated earth spillway. This conclusion is especially true for the Archusa Creek 
Dam, as addressed in the DISCUSSION portion of the paper. 
NRCS (1997) defines the specific process of erosion in dam earthen spillways. 
They describe a 3 phase process: 
• The failure of the vegetal cover protection (if any) and the development of 
concentrated flow 
• The downward and downstream erosion associated with the concentrated flow 
that leads to formation of a vertical or near-vertical head-cut in the vicinity of 
initial failure 
• The upstream advance and deepening of the head-cut resulting from flow over 
the vertical or near vertical face 
Figure 10 illustrates the process of over-topping failure in earth dams. The 
figure illustrates the 3 phase mechanism NRCS describes. Failure is initiated by 
erosion of the soil particles due to excess velocity. A near vertical face is formed, 
which travels progressively toward the reservoir during the erosion process (head-
cutting). Finally the head-cutting process effects complete breach of the dam. 
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Figure 10. Illustration of dam breach by overtopping- embankment breach test 
of a homogeneous non-plastic sandy soil conducted at the ARS Hydraulic 
Laboratory, Stillwater, OK (from FEMA (2001». 
DISCUSSION 
Earth Spillway Design 
Established design methods call for earth spillways to be located at abutments, 
and founded in cut. The criterion to place the spillway in cut is to prevent erosion of 
fill soil. The NRCS design guide has extensive guidance for location, alignment, and 
grade for an emergency spillway so that erosion will not cause a breach failure, 
summarized below. Figure 11 illustrates design guidance for these criteria. 
• Location- The most important element of location is to place the spillway 
where erosion and breach does not result in dam failure. As discussed above, 
this criterion is met by locating the spillway at an abutment, cut into native 
soil (alternatively the spillway can be cut through a saddle in terrain on the 
lake perimeter). Preferred location for the spillway is where it can discharge 
downstream without flow onto the toe of the dam. For sites where this 
alignment is impractical, training dikes can be used to keep flow off of the 
dam toe. But this configuration is not preferable. 
• Alignment and grade- The spillway control section is designed to reduce 
velocity over the spillway to a sustainable level. Alignment and slope on the 
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spillway are set so that velocity stays within the sustainable range for the 
length of the spillway. 
Earthen emergency spillway design for the Archusa Creek Dam did not conform 
to these criteria. The spillway was not located at an abutment in cut. Rather it is 
located in the middle of the dam, with its bottom in fill. The spillway did not have a 
control section sufficient to lower velocity to a sustainable level. Further, the 
drainage ditch excavated into the spillway concentrated flow and increased velocity, 
initiating erosion during the failure storm. 
Figure 50.-.1 Spllh.\·ay gully rcsu.lllng in brc;)ch of spjJJw~y 
-
Figure I I. Diagram illustrating proper emergency spillway layout (From NRCS 
(1997)). 
With the emergency spillway not in conformance with these guidelines, 
erosion was a threat to dam safety. The choice of an emergency spillway lining of 
grass was inappropriate. Some armored lining, e.g. rip-rap would be required for the 
emergency spillway geometry in order to prevent erosion that could result in dam 
breach. 
Hydraulic Design 
NRCS design guides, and most state regulations, require reservoir storage and 
principal spillway capacity such that flow over an emergency spillway commences at 
a storm return period of 100 years. The 1998 configuration of the Archusa Creek 
Dam emergency spillway resulted in flow on near 2 year frequency. 
CONCLUSIONS 
For the 1998 dam configuration, the earth emergency spillway had an 
activation frequency of every 2 years, where this frequency by current design 
standards should be near 100 years. Consequently the emergency spillway was used 
frequently, as opposed to use on an emergency basis . For this frequency of use, the 
spillway should have been an armored auxiliary spillway. The Archusa Creek Dam 
was repaired by building a new auxiliary spillway. The main repair component was a 
concrete labyrinth weir spillway built within the breached area. This new concrete 
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spillway is used as an auxiliary one, solving the problem of flow over an earthen 
emergency spillway at a 2 year frequency. 
The dam breach was actually an over-topping failure . Because the earth 
emergency spillway is located in the interior of the dam (versus at an abutment), and 
built on fill (versus in cut), water flowing over this surface is essentially the same as 
flowing over the dam. 
The case shows the merit of the NRCS design guidance for earth emergency 
spillways. The features identified that do not conform to the NRCS design guide 
were the major factors leading to failure: 
• Location on the dam- not positioned at the abutment cut into native soil. The 
spillway was located near the center of the dam, in a position where erosion 
led to breach through the dam. 
• Spillway surface- in fill versus cut into native soil. The use of erodible fill 
soil in the spillway established the speed limit for water flowing over it, 
roughly 0.8 rnIs (2.5 ftls). The 1998 storm produced flow with velocity much 
greater than this limit. 
• Lack of control section- no means to control velocity at the spillway entrance. 
• Unsuitable lining- grass would not sustain the discharge velocity and 
frequency 
The final conclusion pertains to addition of fish retaining grates over the principal 
spillway crest and sluice gate openings. Generally these grates are put over dam 
outlet controls to keep fish from travelling out of the lake. During the failure storm 
these grates clogged with debris, restricting flow through the principal spillway. The 
capacity lost to grates clogged with flood debris may have never been considered in 
the dam 's operation. Use of fish retaining grates has been implicated in failures and 
near failures of small dams, due to diminished spillway capacity. However, any 
demonstrable benefit of the grates is not clearly established. 
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